The Phantom of Bastar: How Hidma Built Maoists’ Most Lethal Battalion with Links into Odisha.

Hidma’s Deadly Rise: Inside the PLGA Commander’s Network and Its Links to Odisha.

In the dense forests stretching across Chhattisgarh and Odisha, one name continues to cast a long shadow over the country’s anti-Maoist operations — Madvi Hidma, the elusive and feared commander of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) Battalion No.1.

His rise from a low-profile tribal youth in the early 2000s to the head of the most lethal Maoist combat unit highlights the persistent challenges security agencies face in Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-affected regions.

From Recruit to Commander Hidma, estimated to be in his late 30s, was inducted into the PLGA over two decades ago. Standing five-and-a-half feet tall, the young recruit earned early recognition for his endurance, intimate knowledge of forested terrain, and ability to slip past security cordons.

By mid-2000s, senior Maoist leaders reportedly moved him from logistical roles to frontline responsibilities. His precision in planning small, mobile ambushes and his capacity to motivate cadres resulted in his rapid ascent.

He was eventually placed in charge of PLGA Battalion No. 1, the organisation’s most trusted and heavily armed strike unit.

Battalion No. 1 – Maoists’ Most Feared Strike Force the formidable battalion under Hidma’s command comprises 150+ armed cadres, handpicked for strength, loyalty, and combat discipline.

The unit is known for swift cross-border mobility between Chhattisgarh and Odisha

Ability to mobilize large numbers silently, without intelligence leaks

Mastery of terrain-based ambushes use of multi-layered attack points and diversion tactics highly coordinated firing by well-trained rifle squads.

Security officials attribute several major attacks in Bastar and adjoining regions to this battalion, which is considered the most sophisticated operational wing of CPI (Maoist) operational signature terrain, timing, surprise

Hidma’s operations are characterized by careful reconnaissance, exploitation of forest cover, and precise timing. His teams typically study police movement patterns for weeks establish vantage positions for sharpshooters

Create multiple escape routes Conduct attacks in a coordinated 360-degree firing pattern this mastery of guerrilla warfare has made capturing him extremely difficult for security agencies.

Odisha Connection Influence Beyond the Border although Hidma’s base lies in South Bastar of Chhattisgarh, his influence and operational reach have long extended into Odisha’s Malkangiri and Koraput districts, especially during the peak years of Maoist activity strategic Use of Odisha’s border terrain for years, the forested belts of Swabhiman Anchal, Jantri, Jodamba, Andrahal, and Papulari served as transitional routes for Hidma’s cadres temporary shelters for injured or resting fighters logistical hubs for food, medicine, and local support

Before the Gurupriya bridge connected the once-cut-off area, security forces often reported Maoist teams, believed to be linked to Hidma, using boats and forest paths to cross into Odisha after strikes in Chhattisgarh.

Recruitment Influence on Odisha’s Tribal Regions Officials and local sources indicate that Maoist ideologues working under Hidma’s brigade attempted targeted recruitment among tribal youth in malkangiri’s 15 Gram Panchayats of Swabhiman Anchal Koraput’s Narayanpatna–Laxmipur belt Border pockets of Nabarangpur.

The narrative of “protection from state forces” and promises of empowerment were often used to lure vulnerable youth. Several surrendered cadres in Odisha have admitted to training under or receiving instructions from groups aligned with Hidma.

Shared Operational theatre the tri-junction region of Odisha–Chhattisgarh–Andhra Pradesh has historically served as a shared operational theatre where Maoist teams would merge, reorganize, and disperse arms movement and supply networks operated silently

Hidma’s associates coordinated with Odisha-based Area Committees this allowed the Maoists to maintain fluid control over forested borders and evade inter-state combing operations.

Shift in Dynamics Shrinking Space for Maoists however, the past few years have seen a major transformation.Joint operations by Odisha Police, BSF, SOG, DVF, and their Chhattisgarh counterparts have significantly restricted Maoist freedom of movement.

Key developments that weakened Hidma’s Odisha presence include:

The opening of the Gurupriya bridge, ending decades of isolation Establishment of multiple BSF camps in Swabhiman Anchal Strong community policing and surrender-cum-rehabilitation programmes Better intelligence sharing between the two states.

Security forces claim that Maoist cadres loyal to Hidma now avoid long stays in Odisha and largely use border areas only when under pressure.

The Unfinished Pursuit

Despite multiple intelligence inputs and years of tracking, Hidma remains one of the most elusive Maoist commanders. His avoidance of digital communication, constant shifting between camps, and use of deep forest routes make him nearly invisible to surveillance systems.

Senior officials believe he continues to direct attacks and coordinate movement across Bastar, though his operations near Odisha have significantly declined.

Hidma’s rise within the PLGA and his notoriety as the leader of Battalion No. 1 underscore the deep-rooted structural and geographical challenges posed by Left Wing Extremism. While Odisha has substantially regained control over previously Maoist-dominated regions, the historical linkages and cross-border networks built under Hidma still form an important part of the extremist landscape.

Security forces on both sides of the border emphasize that sustained pressure, improved local engagement, and inter-state coordination are crucial to neutralizing the influence of Hidma and dismantling the remaining Maoist infrastructure in the region.